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A STARVING CULTURE: ALASKAN NATIVE VILLAGES’ 
FIGHT TO USE TRADITIONAL HUNTING AND FISHING 
GROUNDS 
Jeffrey W. Stowers, Jr.* 
Every part of all this soil is sacred to my people. Every hillside, 
every valley, every plain and grove has been hallowed by some 
sad or happy event in the days long vanished. The very dust you 
now stand on responds more willingly to their footsteps than to 
yours, because it is rich with the blood of our ancestors, and our 
bare feet are conscious of the sympathetic touch.1 
—Chief Seattle 
I. Introduction 
In the Village of Eyak, some of the young children of the village have 
finally reached an age that they can be taught to hunt and fish. The village 
hunters are preparing to take their children into the wilderness to teach them 
hunting and fishing techniques that have been passed down from parent to 
child for generations. During this outing, they plan to visit all of the hunting 
and fishing spots their parents and grandparents used to take them, and to 
teach their children about what types of wildlife should be hunted.  
This year, Chief Qilangalik leads the hunting expedition—it is time for 
his son, Makari, to learn to hunt and fish. The chief and his son set out 
ahead of the rest of the hunters and head to their first stop, Hinchinbrook 
Island. The Island has an abundance of seals which the hunters plan to use 
for food and trading furs. Afterwards, the chief plans to go to Kenai 
Peninsula to fish for salmon and oysters and to hunt for bear.  
The two hunters barely enter the woods before they are stopped by a 
group of soldiers. The soldier leading the group asks the chief what he is 
doing in the woods. The chief tries to explain to the soldier that his village 
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 1. NATIVE AMERICAN WISDOM ch. 13 (Kent Nerburn & Louise Mengelkoch eds., 
1991). 
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has lived and hunted in the area for many generations, and that he is on a 
hunting expedition with his son that is necessary to teach him the traditions 
of the village—traditions necessary to the survival of the village because 
they are the only way the village obtains food. 
The soldier, unaffected by the chief’s explanation, tells the chief and his 
son to turn around and go back to their village. The soldier also informs the 
pair that the woods and gulf are now under their control and that the village 
hunters are no longer allowed to hunt and fish in the area. Further, the 
soldier tells the hunters that the soldiers and their settlement will be using 
the land from now on because the animal furs obtained in the area are very 
valuable, and the settlement plans to sell them to overseas traders. The chief 
begins to oppose the soldiers, but upon threat of death to both him and his 
son, decides to go back to the village. 
Situations similar to this hypothetical have occurred across the United 
States throughout history. In 1905, the Yakama Indians were excluded from 
hunting and fishing on their traditional hunting grounds by private 
landowners.2 Most recently, the Alaskan Native Villages that surround the 
Outer Continental Shelf were excluded from exercising their right to using 
both land and sea. 
In the most recent litigation regarding land exclusion, the Alaskan Native 
Villages requested non-exclusive aboriginal title to their land after the 
Individual Fishing Quota regulations severely restricted their fishing 
allowance to strictly sport fishing.3 The Ninth Circuit, however, said that 
the Alaskan Native Villages could not have non-exclusive rights without 
first proving that they exclusively occupied the Outer Continental Shelf, 4 
and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in this case upon appeal. 5 
This holding contradicts itself, and does not make clear how a Native 
American tribe can establish non-exclusive aboriginal rights. As of yet, the 
Supreme Court has not defined what “non-exclusive rights” means. This 
article argues that it should do so, and further, create a test through which a 
court can articulate “non-exclusive rights.” 
Part II of this article will discuss the history of the Alaskan Native 
Villages and their historic use of the land on the Outer Continental Shelf 
(“OCS”). This section will also address the procedural history of the prior 
cases, rules, and regulations that gave rise to the dispute over who has the 
right to access the OCS. The history of the land provides evidence that the 
                                                                                                             
 2. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905). 
 3. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 4. Id. at 625. 
 5. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013). 
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Alaskan Native Villages are entitled to continued use of the land, and 
further that hunting and fishing done on and around the land are integral to 
the culture of the Alaskan Natives.  
Part III offers a solution to the dispute over whether the Alaskan Native 
Villages have non-exclusive hunting and fishing rights to the OCS. This 
section suggests an elements test that, if applied by the courts, would 
benefit the Alaskan Native Villages by allowing them to have non-
exclusive hunting and fishing rights while still allowing others to fish the 
OCS. This Article concludes in Part IV by briefly explaining why the 
Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Native Village of Eyak v. 
Blank and why the Ninth Circuit should have allowed the Alaskan Native 
Villages the right to hunt and fish the OCS without IFQ restrictions. 
II. A Look into the Past and How It Will Affect the Future 
A. Thousands of Years of Tradition and the History of Land Use 
The Alaskan Native Villages consist of the Villages of Eyak, Tatitlek, 
Chanega, Port Graham, and Nanwalck (collectively, the “Villages”).6 These 
Villages occupy the Prince William Sound, the Gulf of Alaska, and the 
lower Cook Inlet regions of Alaska, where they claim to have been since 
the time glaciers covered the land.7 Currently, approximately “550,000 
acres of [the Villages’] land are subsurface estate where Native village 
corporations have surface entitlements.”8 The Villages maintain that for 
over 7,000 years, well before European contact and continuing to the 
modern era, they hunted the sea mammals and fished the sea on the OCS,9 
where the resources provided a better chance of a living than the inland 
hunting of moose and caribou.10 Historically, the hunting and fishing 
traditions established on the OCS provided the Villages with a livelihood, 
encouraged trading, and prompted ceremonial exchanges between the 
                                                                                                             
 6. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 7. Id.; see also Our People, CHUGACH, http://www.chugach-ak.com/who-we-are/our-
people (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 8. Lands, CHUGACH, http://www.chugach-ak.com/who-we-are/lands (last visited Oct. 
13, 2015). 
 9. Blank, 688 F.3d at 620-21; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 10. David J. Bloch, Colonizing the Last Frontier, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2004-
2005). 
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tribes.11 Therefore, “the traditions associated with life, love, religion, and 
death came to depend on the ocean and its resources.”12 
In 2012, the Villages’ population was estimated at 400 to 1500 
members,13 who still live a lifestyle heavily reliant on the fish and wildlife 
of the OCS.14 Therefore, the Villages’ “continued social, cultural, and 
economic well-being depends on their continued ability to hunt and to fish 
in their traditional territories on the OCS.”15 
B. A Procedural History: The Native Village of Eyak’s Legal Struggle to 
Maintain Their Rights 
For years, courts have slowly chipped away at Native American tribal 
sovereignty.16 Historically, Native American tribes had sovereign powers 
over their reserved lands given to them by treaties, agreements, and 
executive orders.17 Since 1978, however, the Supreme Court has 
continually reduced “the inherent powers tribes possessed as domestic 
dependent nations and transferred them to the states at the federal 
government's expense but without its consent, indeed to the contrary of 
congressional and executive policy favoring tribal self-determination.”18 
In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations that limited 
the Villages’ use of their traditional fishing areas on the OCS.19 The 
Villages sued, seeking restoration of their rights of aboriginal use to the 
OCS in the Cook Inlet and the Gulf of Alaska.20 
Following a trial court ruling that declined the Villages aboriginal title to 
their traditional hunting and fishing territories,21 the Villages appealed to 
the United States District Court for the District of Alaska in 2002, who 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 6; DEAN LITTLEPAGE, STELLER'S ISLAND: ADVENTURES OF A PIONEER 
NATURALIST IN ALASKA 198 (Kate Rogers et al. eds., 1st ed. 2006); see also Lands, supra 
note 8. 
 12. Bloch, supra note 10, at 6. 
 13. Blank, 688 F.3d at 624. 
 14. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 15. Id. 
 16. But see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Blank, 688 F.3d at 637; 
Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 17. Nolan Shutler, Taking the Bitter with the Sweet: Wenatchi Fishing Rights, 41 
ENVTL. L. 987, 992 (2011). 
 18. Bloch, supra note 10, at 1. 
 19. See Blank, 688 F.3d at 621; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 20. Native Villages of Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Nanwalek, and Port Graham v. Evans, 
NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, http://www.narf.org/cases/eyak.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) 
[hereinafter Native Villages]. 
 21. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1097. 
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agreed with the trial court and held that the Villages did not have non-
exclusive aboriginal rights to their land on the OCS.22 Following this ruling, 
the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) appealed the case to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.23 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case 
to determine if the Villages could establish aboriginal title to the areas in 
the OCS.24 
On remand, the district court found that while the Villages established 
the existence of their territory and use of the waters on the OCS, they did 
not have any aboriginal rights, non-exclusive or otherwise, as a matter of 
law.25 This ruling was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and a 6-5 majority 
sitting en banc ruled that the Villages failed to establish non-exclusive 
aboriginal rights to the OCS territories.26 In July 2013, the NARF appealed 
to the United States Supreme Court.27 Unfortunately, in October 2013, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.28 The culmination of cases, statutes, and 
regulations referenced by the Villages in the course of the litigation 
represent how the Villages fought to perpetuate their culture and how the 
government has slowly chipped away their rights to almost nothing. 
C. The Federal Paramountcy Doctrine 
The “Federal Paramountcy Doctrine” gives the federal government 
superior rights to the marginal sea, an area that extends three miles from the 
shore surrounding the United States, two hundred miles seaward and 
includes the soil and subsoil underneath the surface water.29 This doctrine 
was created from the holdings of four United States Supreme Court cases,30 
                                                                                                             
 22. Native Villages, supra note 20. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Eyak Native Vill. v. Daley, 375 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Native 
Villages, supra note 20. 
 25. Native Villages, supra note 20; Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 626 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 26. Native Villages, supra note 20. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947); United States v. Maine, 420 
U.S. 515, 522-23 (1975); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950); United 
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950). 
 30. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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which arose from disputes between the federal government and the states 
over ownership and control of the territory of the marginal sea.31 
The original dispute began in 1894 when oil was discovered off the coast 
of California.32 As a result, both California and Texas began granting leases 
to oil companies because both states believed that previous Supreme Court 
cases “recognized that they held title to the seabed out to three miles from 
shore,” which is known as the three mile marginal belt.33 Soon after the 
leases were granted, however, Congress decided to bring the seabed under 
public domain, giving the United States the right to lease the seabed.34 
Subsequently, in May of 1945, the United States sued to enjoin Pacific 
Western Oil Company from exercising their rights to the seabed granted to 
them by California.35 In September of that same year, President Harry 
Truman declared that the United States had jurisdiction over the seabed and 
its resources.36 Consequently, these actions led to litigation over who had 
ownership of the seabed.37 
In United States v. California, the United States argued that control over 
the seabed, also known as the “marginal sea and the land under it,” was 
necessary “to protect [the] country against dangers to the security and 
tranquility of its people.”38 California responded by claiming that it owned 
the resources of the marginal sea “because it entered the Union on ‘equal 
footing’ with the original states, which allegedly held title to submerged 
land off their coasts.”39 The Court ultimately disagreed with California, 
finding there was no historical support for California’s claim.40 “The Court 
explained that historically the federal government claimed dominion over 
the three-mile wide marginal sea to protect the nation’s neutrality, and 
                                                                                                             
 31. A marginal sea is an area that separate coastal oceans from open oceans and often 
consist of large indentions into continental landmasses. Marginal Seas, WATER 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/La-Mi/Marginal-Seas.html (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2015). 
 32. Andrew P. Richards, Aboriginal Title or the Paramountcy Doctrine? Johnson v. 
Mcintosh Flounders in Federal Waters Off Alaska in Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler 
Diane Marie, Inc., 78 WASH. L. REV. 939, 950 (2003). 
 33. Id.; see also Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 
26 TEX. L. REV. 398, 401-03 (1948). 
 34. Richards, supra note 32, at 950-51. 
 35. Id. at 951. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29 (1947). 
 39. Richards, supra note 32, at 951 (citing California, 332 U.S. at 29-30). 
 40. California, 332 U.S. at 31-33. 
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recognized that the federal government’s control of the seabed and waters 
bordering the United States enabled it to regulate commerce over, and fight 
wars on, the ocean.”41 Therefore, the Court concluded that the federal 
government, and not the states, held paramount title to control the 
“resources of the soil” under the water of the three-mile marginal belt along 
the coast of the United States.42 
Three years later, in United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court revisited 
the issue, reaffirming its previous holding that the federal government has a 
paramount right to the waters of the ocean extending twenty-four miles past 
the three-mile marginal belt.43 Although Texas argued that because it was 
an independent republic before joining the Union, its state title was 
paramount, and the federal government did not have superior rights to its 
surrounding waters,44 the Supreme Court did not agree, holding that 
“[p]roperty rights must . . . be so subordinated to political rights as in 
substance to coalesce and unite in the national sovereign.”45 The Court 
explained that the state transferred its powers of sovereignty over the 
marginal sea to the federal government once it became part of the 
republic.46 
In United States v. Louisiana, the Court extended the United States’ 
range of control past the three-mile marginal belt.47 In Louisiana, the 
United States sued because Louisiana had leased areas off the Gulf of 
Mexico to oil and resource companies.48 The United States claimed that it 
had full dominion over the waters in the Gulf and that the leases issued by 
Louisiana were adverse to the United States.49 The state argued that it held 
title to the waters and the seabed extending twenty-seven miles off the coast 
because it controlled the disputed area both before and since its admission 
to the Union.50 The Supreme Court disagreed finding the marginal belt a 
national concern, and held the federal government has a paramount right to 
the twenty-four mile waters, including the resources beneath it, extending 
                                                                                                             
 41. Richards, supra note 32, at 952 (citing California, 332 U.S. at 32-35). 
 42. California, 332 U.S. at 38-39. 
 43. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1950). 
 44. Id. at 712-13; Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 
1093 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 45. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719. 
 46. Id.; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093. 
 47. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1950); Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093. 
 48. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 701. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 702. 
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past the three-mile marginal belt described in United States v. California.51 
In support of its ruling, the Court reasoned that “problems of commerce, 
national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace” take 
precedence over state concerns.52 
In the fourth case, United States v. Maine, both the United States and the 
states along the eastern coast claimed title to the areas both within and 
beyond the three-mile marginal bed.53 Both parties wanted title to the 
disputed area to be able to explore the area and utilize its resources.54 The 
United States claimed sovereign rights over the seabed and the subsoil of 
the thirteen Atlantic coastal states’ coastlines,55 an area that “included the 
ocean lying more than three miles seaward from the ordinary low-water 
mark and from the outer limit of inland waters on the coast extending 
seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf.”56 The states claimed that 
they had a superior claim of control over the marginal sea because (1) their 
rights were established before the Constitution was adopted, and (2) the 
states never transferred their rights to the federal government.57 The Court 
concluded, however, that the state’s rights prior to the formulation of the 
Union had no constitutional importance and that the government had 
paramount rights to the waters.58 
The culmination of these rulings created the Federal Paramountcy 
Doctrine. This doctrine is important because it gives the federal government 
broad control over the entire seabed and the soil under the water, which 
includes all resources in the area, including wildlife.59 These rights are 
superior over all other previously established rights of the states, which 
includes any rights held by the Alaskan Native Villages.60 As a result of 
these Supreme Court decisions, “Congress enacted the Submerged Lands 
Act (SLA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).These acts 
surrendered to the states title to the seabed within three miles of their shores 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. at 704-06; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1093. 
 52. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 704. 
 53. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 517-18 (1975). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 516-17; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1094. 
 56. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1094. 
 57. Id.; Maine, 420 U.S. at 519. 
 58. Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23. 
 59. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947); Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23; 
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 
707, 719 (1950). 
 60. California, 332 U.S. at 38-39; Maine, 420 U.S. at 522-23; Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 
701, 706; Texas, 339 U.S. at 719. 
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and extended federal ‘jurisdiction [and] control’ over the seabed beyond 
three miles from shore.”61 Congress also established exclusive regulatory 
authority over fisheries in the area described in the SLA and OCSLA.62 
D. Aboriginal Title 
Native Americans inhabited the land prior to the colonization of the 
United States.63 Chief Justice Marshall recognized these inhabitants as “the 
rightful occupants of the soil”64 in Johnson v. McIntosh, thereby integrating 
the concept of aboriginal title into American law.65 Additionally, Chief 
Justice Marshall expounded on the Doctrine of Discovery in Johnson, 
which directed the European division of the New World and protected the 
Native Americans’ aboriginal title.66 “Aboriginal title refers to the Indians' 
exclusive right to use and occupy lands they have inhabited ‘from time 
immemorial,’ but that have subsequently become ‘discovered’ by European 
settlers.”67 
The purpose behind the aboriginal rights doctrine is based on humanity 
and policy,68 meaning “the rights of the conquered to property should 
remain unimpaired; . . . the new subjects should be governed as equitably as 
the old, and . . . confidence in their security should gradually banish the 
painful sense of being separated from their ancient connexions, and united 
by force to strangers.”69 In presenting the Doctrine of Discovery, the 
Supreme Court determined that Native Americans shall not be unjustly 
oppressed and the rights of Native Americans to their land should not be 
impaired.70 
Aboriginal title is protected by federal law to all territory acquired by the 
United States;71 it may only be extinguished by Congress.72 Further, 
                                                                                                             
 61. Richards, supra note 32, at 950. 
 62. Id. 
 63. E.g., Bloch, supra note 10, at 9; see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
574 (1823). 
 64. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
 65. Richards, supra note 32, at 942. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 248 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1985) 
(Oneida I)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1178 (2006). 
 68. People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 69. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Richards, supra note 32, at 945. 
 72. Id. at 947. 
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aboriginal rights are not created by a treaty or any act of Congress,73 and 
may not, in theory, be extinguished by the Federal Paramountcy Doctrine.74 
Both before and after the establishment of the Federal Paramountcy 
Doctrine, however, courts have attempted to eliminate or restrict aboriginal 
title throughout history. Some historical examples include those previously 
mentioned in this article, among others: the Yakama Treaty of 1855 and 
litigation regarding salmon in 1968; the Native Villages of Eyak cases; the 
Village of Gambell v. Hodel case; and the Native American tribes in 
Washington State. 
One of the government’s earliest attempts at extinguishing aboriginal 
title began with the Yakama Treaty of 1855.75 The signing of the treaty, 
which took place in present day Walla Walla, Washington, was advocated 
by Isaac Stevens, then-governor of Washington.76 Governor Stevens, who 
wanted to make way for settlement and development, pushed for tribal 
approval of the treaty, claiming “settlement was progress,” and the Yakama 
tribes were impeding it.77 As a result, the Yakama Indians agreed to trade 
their 29,000 square miles of land for a less than 2000 square mile 
reservation and $650,000.78 
Approval of the treaty opened up the Yakama tribes’ land for 
colonization, which led to violent conflicts with the government and 
judicial disputes over fishing rights yet to be surveyed.79 Modern litigation 
over Yakama fishing rights, however, began in 1968 when the Yakama 
Indians were forbidden to take salmon from the Columbia River.80 The case 
eventually was appealed to Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the Court 
excluded the Yakama from exercising their fishing rights under the 1855 
Treaty because the Yakama did not relocate to the reservation as dictated by 
Governor Stevens.81 
The Villages face a similar problem today. Their dispute over fishing 
rights, brought before the Ninth Circuit in 1993, arose when the use of their 
                                                                                                             
 73. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 74. People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 75. Shutler, supra note 17, at 1004-05. 
 76. Yakama History, YAKAMA NATION MUSEUM & CULTURAL CTR., 
http://www.yakamamuseum.com/home-history.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 77. Shutler, supra note 17, at 1004-05. 
 78. Id. at 1006. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1012. 
 81. Id. at 1012-13. 
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traditional hunting grounds was limited by the Secretary of Commerce. 82 
The Villages subsequently sued the Secretary of Commerce claiming 
aboriginal title to the OCS, more specifically the Cook Inlet and the Gulf of 
Alaska, as discussed in Part E below.83 
E. Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie 
For more than twenty years now, the Villages have been fighting to 
regain the hunting and fishing rights they claim were established thousands 
of years ago. In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce established regulations, 
in accordance with the Magnuson Act and the Halibut Act,84 which limited 
access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries.85 The Magnuson Act gave the 
United States sovereign control and jurisdiction to waters between three and 
200 miles off the coast of the United States.86 The Halibut Act further 
established an exclusive fishery conservation zone and gave the United 
States sovereign rights and fishery management authority over all fish and 
wildlife on the OCS.87 
Under the Secretary of Commerce’s regulations, non-tribal members 
were authorized to fish within the Tribe’s traditional territories, but tribal 
members were forbidden to access the OCS without Individual Fishing 
Quotas (“IFQ”),88 which only allow the holder to catch a certain number of 
halibut and sablefish per season.89 These regulations also governed non-
commercial sport fishing for halibut, which restricted village members to 
harvesting the halibut with a hook and line, limited the line to only two 
hooks per line, and allowed each fisherman to take home only two fish per 
day.90 These regulations therefore posed a threat to the Villages’ livelihood 
                                                                                                             
 82. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2012); Native Vill. of 
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 83. Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091; see also Native Villages, supra note 20. 
 84. The Halibut Act gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority over the fishery 
conservation zone. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k (2012), cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. The 
Magnuson Act gave the United States: sovereign control and jurisdiction to waters between 
three and 200 miles off the coast of the United States; established an exclusive fishery 
conservation zone; and gave the United States sovereign rights and fishery management 
authority over all fish and wildlife on the OCS. 18 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012), cited in Trawler, 
154 F.3d at 1091. 
 85. Blank, 688 F.3d at 621; Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 1811, cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k, cited in Trawler, 154 F.3d at 1091. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Richards, supra note 32, at 940. 
 90. Bloch, supra note 10, at 8. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
52 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
 
 
by allowing non-tribal members to utilize traditional hunting and fishing 
territories under the Secretary’s authorization, while preventing the 
villagers themselves from doing the exact same thing.91 
The Villages brought suit in the United States District Court for the District 
of Alaska, arguing they had aboriginal title,92 consisting of the right to 
exclusively use, occupy, possess, hunt, fish and exploit the waters of their 
traditional territories on the OCS.93 The court held, however, that the 
Villages did not have aboriginal title because (1) the Federal Paramountcy 
Doctrine precludes aboriginal title to the OCS, and (2) because an 
aboriginal right to fish in navigable waters based on aboriginal title does not 
exist.94 Although the Villages argued their claim of aboriginal title does not 
conflict with the federal government’s paramount title because aboriginal 
title is not a legal title, but only the right to use and occupy their traditional 
territories,95 the court reasoned that if the states do not have superior rights, 
then neither do Native American tribes, even though these tribes existed 
and governed themselves long before the United States came into 
existence.96 
In their appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Villages cited Village of Gambell 
v. Hodel in their argument, which states aboriginal rights may coexist with 
the federal government’s paramount title.97 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
however, stating that any right or title by anyone other than the United 
States, including Native tribes, is not recognized because it opposes the 
Federal Paramountcy Doctrine.98 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded 
that the Hodel case should not be given much deference because that case 
only contemplated aboriginal subsistence rights; exclusive rights to the 
OCS were never considered.99 
As a result, the Ninth Circuit determined the Villages are barred from 
using their traditional hunting and fishing territories because their claims to 
“complete control over the OCS is contrary to these national interests and 
inconsistent with their position as a subordinate entity within our 
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constitutional scheme,”100 and inconsistent with the Federal Paramountcy 
Doctrine.101 The Court also held Native American tribes were similar to the 
original states mentioned in the Federal Paramountcy cases because the 
tribes governed their lands prior to the United States, which would preclude 
their claim over the national government.102 Consequently, the NARF, 
representing the Villages, re-filed the case in district court.103 In this case, 
Native Village of Eyak v. Blank,104 the Villages claimed only non-exclusive 
aboriginal rights to the OCS instead of exclusive rights.105 
F. Native Village of Eyak v. Blank 
In Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, originally known as Native Village of 
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie,106 the NARF represented the Villages of 
Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Nanwalek, and Port Graham.107 The Villages 
again attempted to regain at least part of their aboriginal rights to the OCS, 
this time by challenging the Secretary of Commerce’s declaring of 
Individual Fishing Quota regulations and claiming non-exclusive aboriginal 
rights instead of exclusive aboriginal rights.108 
In 1993, the Secretary of Commerce regulated the Tribes’ access to 
halibut and sablefish on the OCS.109 Prior to the regulations, there was no 
limit to the number of vessels that could commercially harvest halibut or 
sablefish.110 The Secretary’s regulations required any boater who wanted to 
fish commercially to obtain an IFQ which limited how many fish the vessel 
may take.111 The Secretary only allowed IFQs to be assigned to people or 
entities that used vessels to commercially catch halibut or sablefish between 
1988 and 1990.112 As of 2003, the regulations allowed the Villages and 
other subsistence fishers to catch up to twenty halibut per person each 
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day.113 If the Villages met the IFQ requirements, then tribal members could 
fish commercially.114 
The Villages claimed, however, that when the Secretary of Commerce 
issued the new fishing regulations, he did not take into account the tribes’ 
non-exclusive aboriginal rights to hunt and fish the OCS.115 The district 
court dismissed the Villages’ claim by concluding that non-exclusive 
aboriginal rights to hunt and fish the OCS never existed.116 The district 
court found, and the appeals court agreed, that the area claimed was too 
vast with not enough people to control it.117 Furthermore, the court also 
reasoned that the Villages could not have non-exclusive aboriginal rights 
because they could not prove that the ancestral villages exclusively 
controlled any part of the OCS.118 
The holding in this case is contradictory. While the Villages asked for 
non-exclusive aboriginal rights, the court responded by ruling that the 
Villages cannot have non-exclusive rights because they have not 
established exclusive use of the property.119 According to the Court, in 
order for the Villages to establish non-exclusive rights, they have to satisfy 
an exclusivity requirement.120 These terms are incongruous. It is impossible 
for someone to be exclusive and non-exclusive at the same time. The Court 
confused the issue by reasoning a non-exclusive issue was based solely on 
exclusivity. Therefore, the issue of non-exclusive rights to hunt and fish 
needs to be addressed and defined. As a result, the development of a new 
test is necessary to determine whether or a not a Native American tribe 
qualifies for access to their traditional hunting and fishing grounds. 
III. A New Precedent to Be Set 
In Blank, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dodged the issue of non-
exclusive hunting and fishing rights, simply reiterating what the district 
court said about exclusive rights, even though the Villages raised a different 
issue.121 The Villages based their claim on the issue of non-exclusive 
aboriginal rights, but the Court’s reasoning of the case was centered on 
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exclusivity.122 The Court’s conclusion is contradictory, and has created a 
great deal of confusion as to what role “exclusivity” plays in the 
determination of non-exclusive rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
no longer consider exclusivity, define the term “non-exclusive,” and 
implement a new element test that will determine if a Native American tribe 
has non-exclusive rights to use their land. 
A. Instructive Areas of Law 
There are several factors which, when taken together, can provide the 
Court with a means by which “non-exclusive” can be defined. First, the 
Court should look at easements, which allow one or more parties to use 
another’s land. The OCS is owned by the United States, but the Villages 
have claims to the area as well. Therefore, easements would be helpful in 
determining the Villages’ use of the land. The Court should also look at 
aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is at the core of this entire controversy. It is 
how this situation came before the courts in the first place.123 As a result, it 
would be useful to consider this doctrine when determining non-exclusive 
hunting and fishing rights. 
1. Easements 
Since the Villages are seeking rights to use land that is supposedly no 
longer their own, property law is relevant. Specifically, the Court in 
formulating a test should examine easements because certain treaty 
provisions, which are superior to state law, grant tribes rights to hunt and 
fish on lands not designated to their reservation,124 which is analogous to 
the Villages and their desired access to the OCS. An easement is the right to 
use another person’s property for a specific purpose.125 The type of 
easement most applicable to the Villages’ situation is an easement by 
necessity, which can be established by showing: (1) a unity of ownership of 
the land; (2) a severance of that ownership; (3) proof that, at the time of the 
severance, an easement is necessary to benefit one of the parties; and (4) a 
continuing necessity of the easement.126 Even though this type of easement 
is typically used for landlocked estates,127 it can be applicable here in 
developing a definition for non-exclusive rights. 
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The Villages, who have existed along the OCS for thousands of years,128 
meet all four of these elements. They hunted, fished, and made use of the 
land until the European nations began to invade their land.129 Like the 
original states, the Villages had their own government congruent with the 
federal government.130 These factors, taken together, show that both the 
Villages and the federal government had claim to the same land, satisfying 
the unity of land requirement. 
As shown by the previously explained cases, the federal government 
took control, however, and began passing legislation that limited the 
Villages’ use of the land, severing some of their rights to access and use the 
land as they had long before the United States came into existence. As a 
result, the severance element is met. As previously discussed, access to 
these territories is necessary for the Villages’ survival because their way of 
life centered on their hunting and fishing expeditions, as opposed to the 
economy followed by the progressing United States.131 This way of life is 
how the Villages still live to this day.132 Therefore, the necessity 
requirement is met. Similar to how parties can have co-existing interests in 
easement by necessities, judicial history shows that under the Federal 
Paramountcy Doctrine, aboriginal title and federal paramountcy can exist 
simultaneously.133 As a result, an easement by necessity analysis is 
beneficial to the development of a non-exclusive aboriginal rights test and 
definition. 
2. Elements of Aboriginal Title 
Aboriginal title is at the heart of this case. Therefore, it should be taken 
into consideration in determining hunting and fishing rights, but it should 
not be dispositive. In Blank, the Ninth Circuit held that the Villages did not 
have non-exclusive hunting and fishing rights to the OCS because they 
failed to establish the exclusivity requirement of aboriginal title.134 In order 
for the Villages to prove aboriginal title, they had to prove the existence of 
actual, exclusive, continuous use and occupancy of the land “for a long 
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time.”135 The “use and occupancy” element is proven by the Tribe’s “way 
of life, habits, customs, and usages of the Indians who are [the land’s] users 
and occupiers.”136 Exclusivity is proven when a tribe demonstrates that they 
used and occupied the land to the exclusion of others.137 The Court 
concluded that the Villages must have “‘an exclusive and unchallenged 
claim to the disputed areas’ to be entitled to aboriginal rights.”138 
Some elements of aboriginal title should be considered in determining 
hunting and fishing rights, but others are no longer valid. The continuous 
use and occupancy prong, however, is one element relevant in determining 
rights to use the OCS. Continuous use is important because this element 
prevents anyone from laying claim to areas that they have used 
infrequently. The “for a long time” element is also important because it 
prevents those from being allowed to use land that they have not been on 
long enough to make it their own. These elements should therefore be used 
in the new non-exclusive aboriginal rights test that will be discussed later. 
The other elements of aboriginal title are no longer valid, especially 
exclusivity. The Villages are not asking to exclude others from the land. 
They only want to be able to hunt and fish the OCS without interference 
from the government, and consequently exclusivity is a factor that no 
longer needs to be considered when determining non-exclusive hunting and 
fishing rights. Therefore, when a court is considering whether a Native 
American tribe is presently seeking non-exclusive aboriginal rights, even if 
they have claimed exclusive aboriginal rights before, the court should not 
consider previous “exclusivity” of the land when making its decision. 
B. Exclusivity No Longer Required 
1. The Exclusivity Requirement Is Unnecessary 
In Native Villages of Eyak v. Blank, the Villages were denied non-
exclusive rights because the Villages could not prove exclusivity. 139 
Exclusivity is satisfied when a tribe or group can prove that they used and 
occupied the land to the exclusion of other tribes or groups.140 The court 
concluded that the use of the OCS is not enough to show exclusive 
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possession.141 Exclusivity is proven when the tribe or group exercises full 
control over the area they claim,142 established when the tribe or group has 
the power to expel intruders from the land.143 The court in Blank 
determined that the Villages failed to show they could “exclusive[ly] 
control, collectively or individually,” the claimed areas of the OCS.144 
Exclusivity is not needed, however, in order to establish non-exclusive 
rights to hunt and fish. First, the terms are incongruous, as previously 
stated. A person or group cannot establish non-exclusive rights by being 
required to prove exclusivity. This is confusing to those seeking 
clarification from the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Therefore, the new claim of 
non-exclusive rights should render the exclusivity requirement to hunt and 
fish moot. Also, the Ninth Circuit explained the Villages have no hunting 
and fishing rights because there is no way they could exclusively occupy 
such a vast amount of land while simultaneously preventing others from 
using the land.145 It is an impossible task. The Villages’ traditional hunting 
and fishing areas encompass at least the 550,000 acres of land mentioned 
above. The Villages include a maximum of 1500 members,146 but even if 
every single member monitored these lands, it is realistically impossible for 
the Villages to exclude others from using the land. For example, if every 
single member of the Villages spent their day monitoring the area 
mentioned, each member would have to cover around 366 acres every day.  
Additionally, the Villages have a vast area on the OCS to hunt and fish. 
Due to the small population of these Villages, their fishing and hunting 
activity would not significantly impact the fish and game population. The 
commercial fishing that the IFQs and Secretary of Commerce’s regulations 
are meant to protect will not suffer a large enough loss to negatively affect 
the fish supply.147 Therefore, the Villages should be allowed to use their 
traditional territories without having to comply with the restrictive IFQ 
regulations.  
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2. Non-exclusive Rights: Not a Foreign Concept 
The Supreme Court has commented on the issue of non-exclusive rights. 
In United States v. Winans, the Native Americans of the Yakama Nation 
sought to enjoin non-tribal members from obstructing their exercise of 
fishing rights and privileges.148 The Yakama conveyed their rights and title 
to their land to the United States, but they reserved the right to use and 
occupy the aforementioned land in an 1859 Treaty between the United 
States and the Tribe.149 Additionally, an exclusive right to fish navigable 
waters running through or bordering the reservation, or at areas traditionally 
fished, was secured to the tribes of that reservation.150 This right included 
the right to fish at all the Tribe’s usual and accustomed places, even though 
these locations may be held in common with non-tribal members residing in 
the same territory.151 “[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, 
but a grant of right from them—a reservation of those not granted.”152 
The non-tribal members in Winans claimed that the state-issued license 
gave them exclusive rights to fish using a device called a fishing wheel on 
the Tribe’s fishing grounds,153 which they placed in the Columbia River in 
Washington State.154 They argued that when Washington became part of 
the United States, the treaty provisions were extinguished and the United 
States federal government granted Washington sole power over the 
property in question.155 
The Supreme Court disagreed, found the Treaty remained valid, and held 
that a license from the State given to non-tribal members to fish does not 
mean that Native Americans are excluded from fishing at the same 
locations.156 According to the Treaty, the Yakama Indians’ fishing rights 
were shared in common with the fishing rights of non-tribal members. 157 
Therefore, the state licenses to use the fishing wheels did not give the non-
tribal members the right to exclude the Native Americans.158 As a result, the 
Yakama Indians were ultimately allowed to continue fishing the area as 
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they always had, as being allowed to hunt and fish was about as “necessary 
to the existence of the Indians [as] the atmosphere they breathed.”159 
The Villages’ situation is very similar to the Winans case. Similarly to 
the licenses issued in Winans,160 the IFQs were issued to commercial, non-
tribal members to fish the traditional Native American grounds on the OCS 
because the increase in non-tribal fishermen was contributing to the 
decrease of the sablefish and halibut population.161 Unlike the license in 
Winans, however, the Villages were not allowed to continue to fish despite 
the issued license, but instead, became subject to the IFQ requirements. The 
Ninth Circuit eventually allowed the Villages to subsistence fish, but only 
allowed them to fish using the most basic techniques, while non-tribal 
members with IFQs were allowed more modern techniques that allowed 
them better chances to catch fish for profit.162 
The Ninth Circuit should have followed in the Supreme Court’s footsteps 
in Winans. The Villages were not asking the Court to exclude the 
commercial fishermen, but instead requested permission to continue their 
way of life without the hindrance of government regulations. As previously 
mentioned, the OCS and the land surrounding it have been home to the 
Villages for thousands of years.163 By denying access or only allowing 
access that is severely limited, it would be no different than the government 
allowing someone else to harvest another farmer’s land, and in doing so, 
only allow the original farmer and landowner to use a small corner of that 
land for himself and harvest it using just a hoe and a spade. 
Therefore, the Villages should be allowed to continue to hunt and fish on 
the OCS alongside the other commercial fishermen, but without the 
limitation of regulations. It is possible for more than one group of people to 
use and occupy land jointly and amicably.164 Both the Villages and the 
commercial fishermen can live, hunt, and fish the same lands in harmony.  
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C. A New Element Test 
Considering other areas of law and different cases throughout history, a 
new element test can be created to determine non-exclusive hunting and 
fishing rights for the Villages and other Native American tribes across the 
nation. In his dissent in Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, Chief Justice 
Fletcher sided with the Villages, noting the tribes established their 
aboriginal title in at least part of the claimed area.165 Chief Justice Fletcher 
stated that the case should have been remanded back to the lower courts to 
determine what rights the Villages would have under the exclusivity test. 166 
Unfortunately, history has proven that aboriginal title has all but been 
eliminated,167 which makes the exclusivity test no longer appropriate. It 
would be futile for the Villages to argue aboriginal title again. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court should define the term “non-exclusive” and implement a 
new element test that will determine if a Native American tribe has non-
exclusive rights to use their land.  
The Supreme Court should adopt the following term and definition of 
“non-exclusive aboriginal rights:” non-exclusive aboriginal rights are rights 
held by Native American tribes that grant them unhindered use of their 
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, alongside commercial huntsmen 
and fishermen, without being limited to the same regulations as the 
commercial entities.168 In order for non-exclusive rights to exist, a tribe 
must satisfy all the following elements. First, a tribe must have made use of 
the land before the colonization of the United States.169 Second, the land in 
controversy must be the “usual and accustomed places” used by the 
Tribe.170 Third, the use of the land must be continuous.171 If a tribe can 
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satisfy these elements, the tribe should be allowed to use their traditional 
hunting and fishing grounds alongside commercial fishermen and without 
interference from the government. 
The current interferences of the government, such as the IFQ regulations 
and the basic fishing techniques restrictions, make it extremely difficult for 
Native Americans to fish the area. The imposed restrictions do not allow 
Native Americans the ability to catch enough fish before the season runs 
out and before the commercial fishermen take just enough fish to prevent 
damage to the population. Generally, people who have lived on a certain 
area of land for a long period time, and have used that land for hunting and 
fishing, become familiar with that land’s wildlife, and become aware of the 
dangers posed to that wildlife when individuals fish outside of season and 
overfish. Therefore, those people would only hunt and fish at the 
appropriate time and would take no more than what they needed to survive 
because they know that doing so protects the population of the game in 
season, as well as other wildlife.172 
1. Use of the Land Before the Colonization of the United States 
The first element that should be considered in determining non-exclusive 
aboriginal title is the “use of the land before the colonization of the United 
States.” The development of this element was inspired by the Sac & Fox 
test, more specifically the “for a long time” element, which helps determine 
the existence of the aboriginal title. Chief Justice Marshall’s explanation of 
aboriginal title was also considered in developing this part of the non-
exclusive aboriginal rights test. 
This element is necessary to ensure that if certain tribal members relocate 
to lands inhabited by their ancestors, those individuals cannot claim non-
exclusive rights to uninhibitedly hunt and fish foreign lands just because 
they are of Native American descent. For example the Appalachian 
Mountains have many people of Melungeon ancestry, which consist of at 
least one Native American relative somewhere in their lineage.173 However, 
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many of these people have never participated in traditions, such as hunting 
and fishing, from their Native American heritage.174 As a result, these 
individuals should not be able to claim rights to their Native American 
ancestors’ traditional hunting and fishing grounds because hunting and 
fishing for themselves and the tribe is not an integral part of their daily life. 
The amount of time needed to satisfy the "for a long time" element is not 
defined by a certain number of years, but is shown by the amount of time it 
took for a Native American tribe to turn the wilderness into domesticated 
lands.175 Domestic lands are those which are adapted or used by a person or 
group for one’s own purpose.176 Additionally, the tribe must have 
domesticated the land before the United States became a country.177 The 
Villages claim to have been using the land in question for over 7000 years, 
which substantially predates the colonization of the United States. 178 
Archeological dig sites have revealed that the Villages occupied the OCS 
and the land surrounding it since glaciers covered most of the area during 
the last ice age.179 For example, dig sites uncovered various types of 
artifacts which include tools, weapons, and remnants of housing 
establishments.180 These items include grinding stones, harpoon heads, 
bone tools, slate awls, house posts, stone lamps, and bones and shells from 
a variety of mammals and shellfish left over from meals.181 These 
archeological discoveries show that the Villages were the ones who 
conquered the land because they are evidence of an established culture and 
a set way of life.182 
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Additionally, the Villages were the first people to greet the European 
explorer, Vitus Bering, and his group when they came to Alaska in 1741.183 
The greetings, along with the archeological discoveries, show that the 
Villages lived on the land long enough to make it their home. The presence 
of coffins and ornaments show that the Villages had established the area as 
a respectful place to lay their dead to rest, while weapons show that they 
were hunting and protecting the land in which they lived. The artwork also 
shows their hunting traditions in the area and that they have integrated the 
area into their religious practices. 
These examples represent that the Villages put down roots, developed 
customs and traditions, and made the area on and around the OCS a 
permanent place to live. As a result, the Villages have satisfied the time 
element of non-exclusive rights test. If the United States would allow the 
Villages to use the land, they would be able to continue their time-honored 
traditions to help ensure the survival of their culture. By denying the 
Villages rights to use their traditional hunting and fishing areas, essential 
knowledge dies with the older generation, which prevents the present 
generation from carrying on traditions held dear by the Villages people. 
Therefore, granting the Villages their requested rights is necessary for their 
culture to survive.  
2. Usual and Accustomed Grounds and Stations 
Hunting and fishing grounds, which are areas used as part of a Native 
American tribe’s habits and customs, are considered as much under a 
Native American tribe’s possession as a cleared field is under a non-
Indian’s possession.184 In United States v. Washington, the district court 
concluded that the Native American tribes of that area had the right to fish 
on areas not designated to their reservations, but those rights were held “in 
common” with the rights of non-Native American tribal members.185 These 
off reservation areas are reserved to the “usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations.”186 “Usual and accustomed” include fishing areas familiar to the 
tribal members and excludes areas that are unfamiliar locations or locations 
used in long intervals, infrequently, or in extraordinary situations. 187 
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“Grounds” and “stations” are often used together, but they are actually 
separate terms with each having its own meaning.188 “Stations” are 
considered as fixed locations and other narrow limited areas.189 These areas 
are indicated by structures such as fishing platforms.190 “Grounds” are 
larger areas that may encompass several stations and other unspecified 
locations.191 The Tribes’ oral history was able to pinpoint specific fishing 
locations, but it was impossible to recall every single fishing location used 
by the Tribes.192 
Some of the tribes even developed “usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations” through the use of their boating routes as long as those routes were 
not used solely for travel.193 Some of the marine areas identified as hunting 
and fishing grounds by the tribes were the Lummi reef in Northern Puget 
Sound, the Makah halibut banks, Hood Canal and Commencement Bay.194 
Therefore, the court concluded that every fishing location where the tribes 
customarily and occasionally fished, “however distant from the then usual 
habitat of the tribe, and whether or not other tribes then also fished in the 
same waters, is a usual and accustomed ground or station at which the 
treaty tribe reserved, and its members presently have, the right to take 
fish.”195 This case made its way through the appeals process until it finally 
came before the Ninth Circuit.196 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision in holding the Native American tribes had “a right to an 
actual share of certain valuable species of fish, not merely a right to the 
opportunity to catch fish, and that state police power regulations cannot be 
used unduly to impair this right.”197 
Oral history has shown that the Villages have been hunting and fishing 
on this land for millennia,198 and says that the Villages came upon the land 
one day while their hunters were kayaking along the Pacific coastline. 199 
During the hunters’ exploration, they saw a large black object sticking up 
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out of the ice.200 The hunters paddled over to investigate and discovered the 
object coming out of the ice was actually mountaintops emerging out of the 
retreating glacial ice.201 These mountains also contained ice-free shores in 
which the Villages started their first settlements.202 The years and seasons 
came and went, which quickly melted the last remnants of the glaciers. 203 
The melted ice exposed deep fjords and lagoons that contained abundances 
of sea life and provided habitable beaches on which to erect settlements. 204 
“When the ice retreated, so did the animals. The Villages followed the ice 
and animals deep into the heart of Prince William Sound, where they 
remain to this very day.”205 
The Villages are not asking for permission to hunt and fish on lands that 
they have never, or even on rare occasion, hunted on. They are asking to 
hunt and fish on lands traditionally used today and by their ancestors. 
Similar to the tribes pinpointing fishing locations in Washington, the 
Villages also pointed to their hunting and fishing locations, which include 
the Prince William Sound area, the Gulf of Alaska, and the Cook Inlet. 
Furthermore, just as the tribes in Washington referenced their oral history, 
the Villages used their oral history to show how they came to inhabit the 
area. This history shows the Villages have established “usual and 
accustomed grounds and stations” for hunting and fishing. Stations were 
created by the Villages’ initial settlements on the beach. Even after the ice 
retreated and the Villages moved inland, they continued to visit the OCS to 
hunt and fish for marine life. Grounds were established by the Villages’ 
move inland and the continuous hunting and fishing away from the villages. 
The relocation did not make the land any less familiar. 
As a result, the Villages are requesting that the Ninth Circuit follow in its 
own precedent set in Washington and allow them to hunt and fish on lands, 
even if those lands were away from their villages, that they have used for 
centuries. They are asking to be able to continue a way of life passed 
through thousands of years of traditions, uninhibited by the government, on 
the same grounds hunted and fished by their ancestors. The Villages have 
proven that they have continued to use the same lands for thousands of 
years, and therefore meet this element of the test and should be allowed to 
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hunt and fish alongside the commercial fishermen without any interference 
from the government or non-tribal fisherman. 
3. Continuous Use of the Land 
The Villages must also prove their use of the land has been continuous. 
“Continuous use and occupancy” must be “in accordance with the way of 
life, habits, customs and usages of the Indians who are its users . . . .”206 
The lower court in Blank determined that the Villages’ hunting and fishing 
rights were integral to their ancestors’ way of life,207 and also concluded the 
Villages and their ancestors were skilled hunters and fishermen of the 
OCS.208 Their way of life provided them with the years of experience 
needed to develop their skilled techniques; the Villages knew the land and 
the sea,209 and knew the ocean currents so well that they were able to 
navigate the OCS on their boats with ease.210 These skills were developed 
as the Villages and their ancestors traveled through Middleton Island, the 
Barren Islands, the Cook Inlet, and the Copper River Delta on numerous 
hunting and fishing expeditions.211 As a result, there is a strong likelihood 
that the Villages seasonally used portions of the OCS lands closest to their 
villages and during their travels to outside lands.212 
Continuous use of land is not strictly limited to a Native American 
tribe’s settlements.213 Continuous use also includes areas of land that a tribe 
continuously utilizes for hunting even if the area in question is used 
seasonally or intermittently.214 The District Court said that the Villages did 
not make regular use of the claimed areas of the OCS,215 and the Secretary 
that issued the IFQs that restricted the Villages’ right to hunt and fish the 
OCS argued the Villages’ use of the land was “too sporadic” to establish 
rights to hunt and fish the OCS.216 However, seasonal and occasional use is 
sufficient enough to satisfy the continuous use and occupancy requirement 
as long as the use of the land is “consistent with the seasonal nature of the 
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ancestors’ way of life as marine hunters and fishermen.”217 The majority of 
the justices in the Blank case agreed that the Villages made continuous use 
of the land on the OCS.218 
IV. Conclusion 
Over the years, the government has continually passed laws while the 
courts have made precedents that prevent Native American tribes across the 
country from using their traditional hunting and fishing grounds. By not 
addressing the issue on non-exclusive aboriginal rights, the courts run the 
risk of slowly destroying entire Native American cultures to which hunting 
and fishing traditions are essential to survival. These traditions, how these 
tribes survived before the establishment of the United States government, 
were essential to tribal members to feed their families. Notwithstanding 
need, however, tribal members made the best use out of everything that 
they caught and left nothing to waste. They used the hides for clothes and 
the bones for weapons and tools, and what they did not use to sustain the 
village, they traded with other villages for supplies. By inhibiting the 
Native Americans’ abilities to hunt and fish, tribes are inhibited from 
teaching their children these customs, which may be detrimental to any 
hope tribes have of ensuring the survival of their culture.  
When most people watch documentaries about Native American culture, 
they are amazed at the beauty of their traditions, which can include the 
intricate design of leather clothing made from animal hides, the immense 
effort put into a handmade knife made from animal bones, or crafting 
elaborate headdresses made of bird feathers. For the Alaskan Native 
Villages, however, their culture is deteriorating because they lack sufficient 
access to their traditional hunting and fishing areas and are inhibited by 
governmental regulations. Without an established definition of non-
exclusive aboriginal rights and requirements to obtain those rights, Native 
American tribes are prevented from continuing traditions that have been 
passed on from generation to generation for thousands of years. When the 
older generation cannot teach the younger generation the tribe’s ways of 
life, the culture dies because no one has the knowledge to carry on those 
time honored traditions. 
By failing to address the non-exclusive aboriginal rights issue raised by 
the Villages, the courts are establishing precedents and ruling in favor of 
enacted statues that prevent the tribes from continuing a way of life that has 
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been in practice uninhibited for millennia. As a result of these precedents, 
the Native Americans can be denied rights to land that they have used for 
thousands of years in favor of granting commercial rights to non-indigenous 
people who are only using the land and sea for monetary gain. Allowing 
this to happen is no different than an entity taking a farmer’s land, letting 
someone else harvest the crops, but telling the farmer he or she cannot 
touch the produce.  
The Supreme Court should have granted the Villages petition for a writ 
of certiorari and addressed the issue of whether or not the Villages have 
non-exclusive rights to hunt and fish on the Outer Continental Shelf. Upon 
hearing the case, the Supreme Court should have considered easements in 
giving the Villages their deserved rights. Easements, along with the Winans 
case, illustrate how the Villages and the non-tribal members can hunt and 
fish alongside each other without conflict or disastrous results. Finally, the 
Court should have considered the new definition and elemental test 
provided to determine that the Villages have non-exclusive rights to hunt 
and fish the OCS. Hopefully, other courts across the United States will use 
this new definition and test to grant other Native American tribes access the 
traditional hunting and fishing to which they are currently denied or given 
limited access, in an effort to preserve their cultures and ways of life for 
years to come. 
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